



Tafsir Tarbawi: The Verse Of Education As A Basis For The Concept Of Ethical Education Of Ibn Miskawaih And Al-Ghazali (Comparative Analysis)

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Abstrak: Tafsir Tarbawi is a subject at the Faculty of Tarbiyah and Faculty Teacher of Training that seeks to find educational concepts in interpreting educational verses in the Qur'an. This article rests on educational verses examining the history of the development of moral education, which found a crossroads between Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali, where the tradition inherited by the first figure is commonly referred to as the rational tradition. In contrast, the second figure is referred to as the mystical tradition. To obtain clarity on the format of Ibn Miskawaih's thinking pattern, which some parties call a driver of progress and vice versa, al-Ghazali, whom some parties accuse as one of the causes of the stagnation of the dynamics of intellectual movement in the Muslim world, the author tries to dialogue the thoughts of moral education of the two figures. This study is carried out by analyzing the comparative thinking of the concept of moral education both in aspects: basic concepts, human existential structure, moral virtues, and components of moral education.

Keywords: Tafsir Tarbawi, pendidikan akhlak, akhlak rasional, akhlak mistik, Ibnu Miskawaih, Al-Ghazali.

INTRODUCTION

The destruction of communist ideology at the end of the 20th century started from anti-god premises, which then turned into anti-humanity with the evil and cruelty done to the people. Communist ideological doctrines are often considered to oppose religion; in any country, they can influence and dominate. Many people who adopt these doctrines, sometimes without realizing it, incorporate them into their daily lives. Communism fundamentally conflicts with theology, fostering not only distrust in God but also an anti-God, anti-religion stance, sometimes leading to aggression towards religious groups (Alam & David, 2021). Meanwhile, according to some observers, capitalism, which is still in its heyday, can not be used as an alternative for building future civilizations. This is because of its greedy, demoralized nature, and it can only give birth to a hedonistic society under the veil of the welfare state (Joseph et al., 1979). According to Herbert Marcuse, the fruit of this capitalist system is the fading of the

inner dimension of thought, the extinction of the critical power of the ratio, and the delay to the facts of life (Herbert Marcuse, 1972).

Ontological security is the need to experience oneself as a whole and continuous person in order to realize a sense of belonging to moral foundations for the survival of the human race on the surface of the earth. Katharine, Toni, Roberta, "Equalities in freefall? Ontological insecurity and the long-term impact of COVID-19 in the academy" (Gender Work Organ: Juni 2020).

Islam, as a movement for moral and social renewal since the beginning of the 7th century, has been explicitly declared by the Prophet Muhammad. It has declared that its main task is the perfection of human morality. The Qur'an emphatically confirms that he was a man of great morality. (Qs. al-Qalam (68): 4.) Therefore, he should be a life example. (Qs. a-Ahzāb (33): 21.

In the annals of socio-historical records, Islam has experienced periods of both glory and decline. The golden age of Islam is said to have occurred between 650 and 1250 AD. Historians refer to this period as the classical period in the history of the development of Islamic history. During this period, Muslims became a superpower that controlled most of the countries on three continents: Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Their territory reached Spain in the Western hemisphere and India in the Eastern hemisphere. The height and progress of civilization during this period is immortalized in history by names such as Imam Malik, Abu Hanifah, Syafi'i, Ibn Hambal, Al-Asy'ari, Al-Maturidi, Wasil bin Atha', Zunnun al-Mishri, Abu Yazid Al-Busthami, Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Miskawaih, Al-Ghazali, and a number of other names with the greatness of their respective works. At that time, however, the Islamic Ummah was plagued by divisions and stagnation, which eventually led to the decline of the world. In addition to the transfer of territories previously under Muslim rule to the West, the period saw the end of the dominance of scientific figures comparable to those of the previous era. Despite the initial revival of Islam in the early 19th century, the West continues to exert a significant influence over the Islamic world, both directly and indirectly.⁷ (Harun Nasution, *Pembaharuan dalam Islam: Sejarah Pemikiran dan Gerakan* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1990), 12-4.)

The cause of the decline of Muslims according to Harun Nasution is the lack of utilization of their thinking power, even though Islamic teachings strongly encourage the use of this thinking power.⁸ (Harun Nasution, *Akal dan Wahyu dalam Islam* (Jakarta: UI Press, 1983), 5-8.) Therefore, the way to reach this goal is none other than to review Islam responsibly and continuously to obtain key concepts for solving the fundamental problems that face us.

As mentioned above, the classical period of Islam should be used as a reference for the direction of today's education, because history has proved that the education of the classical period was able to motivate the realization of the golden age of Islam. In this case, the heritage of Islamic literature contains many works on various disciplines, including works on moral education. The revelation of the philosophers' thoughts in the field of morality is intended as material for consideration to take the concepts of moral education that are worthy of revival and can be applied to moral education today and in the future.

Moral education is generally divided into two categories: rational moral education and mystical moral education (Muhammad Ali Saputra, 2014)

The distinction between the two types of moral education has implications for the growth of creativity and initiative, with rational morals fostering these qualities more effectively than mystical morals. This is due to differences in approach. Rational moral education is derived from Islamic teachings, not merely absolute doctrines (humanitarian approach). In contrast, mystical moral education approaches Islamic teachings as absolute teachings (divine approach). The humanitarian approach indicates that humans are autonomous, while the divine approach places humans as heteronomous creatures (M.Mujib Hidayat , 2018).

One of the classical philosophers who is considered a school of rational moral education is Ibn Miskawaih. This is evidenced by one of his works, namely *Tahzib al-Akhlāq wa Tathīr al-A'raq* Muhammad Abduh's reference book for the teaching of morality in his home (Muhammad Rashīd Ridā, 1931). Thus, according to Rasyid Ridha, the book underlies the behavior of Muhammad Abduh, who is known as a contemporary reformer in Islam. It is also assumed that by making Ibn Miskawaih's work as a handbook for the moral teaching of Muhammad Abduh, then Ibn Miskawaih's moral thinking can motivate renewal thinking in Islam.

Another figure besides Ibn Miskawaih is al-Ghazali, a Sufi and philosopher who also talks a lot about moral education. This right can be seen in all of Al-Ghazali's works, especially in the following *Ihya' 'Ulūm al-Dīn, Fātih{at al-'Ulūm, Mizān al-'Amal, Mi'rāj al-Sālikīn* and *Ayyuhā al-Walad*. As for al-Ghazali's thoughts on his religious and Sufistic (Fatiyah Hasan Sulaiman, 1990).

Based on this thought, the author tries to analyze the basis of his second concept of moral education from the verses of the Qur'an, especially the verses on moral education, with a tarbawi tafsir approach.

METHODS

This research is a library research, namely data collection techniques by understanding and studying theories from various kinds of literature related to tarball tafsir research on comparative analysis of the concept of Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghozali's moral education. In this literature research, researchers use four stages, namely preparing the necessary equipment, preparing a working bibliography, organizing time, and reading or recording research materials (Zed, 2004). The data collection uses a way of tracking primary sources, namely books written by Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali, and their thoughts from various secondary sources from books, journals, and research that has been done that has something to do with this research. The literature obtained from various references is critically analyzed and compared to the construction of their thoughts to obtain a complete concept of moral education.

DISCUSSION

Human existence structure

The structure of human existence is mentioned in the Qur'an Surah Al-Hijr 15:29: Meaning: "So when I have fashioned him and had a spirit of My Own 'creation' breathed into him, fall down in prostration to him."

From this verse, Miskawaih views human beings as consisting of two substances.: first, the substance in the form of the body as material knowledge, and second, the soul (*al-nafs*), namely dimensionless substance as immaterial insight, and this is what is the essence of human beings (Ibnu Miskawaih, 1994). Al-Ghazali in his philosophy book *ma'ārij alquds* holds the same view as Ibn Miskawaih (Al-G azālī, 968). However, in the book Sufism *mi'rāj al-sālikīn* describes humans as consisting of soul (*al-nafs*), spirit (*al-rūh*), and body (*al-jism*) (Al-Gazālī, 1964). In the discussion of morality, al-Ghazali referred to immaterial knowledge with three terms; spirit (*alrūh*), soul (*al-nafs*) and body (*al-jism*). However, the essence of man remains the same, namely *al-nafs* (soul).

After that both Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali divided the soul (*al-nafs*) into three parts, Ibn Miskawaih discusses the three parts with the faculty of thinking (*alquwwah al-naṭīqah*), anger faculty (*al-quwwah al-gaabiyyah*), and the faculty of lust (*al-quwwah al-shahwiyyah*). While Al Ghazali termed the faculty of thinking with *al-nafs alinsāniyyah* (the soul as human essence), anger faculty with the term *al-nafs al-ayawaniyyat*, and the faculty of lust by using the term *al-nafs al-hayawaniyyah* Al-Gazālī, *Mi'yār al-'Ilm* (Sulayman Dunya, 1960).

Obviously the difference that occurs in this aspect is only in the use of terms, but the understanding remains the same. Both also assume that the soul *al-natiqah* (rational faculty) occupies the highest position. Because this faculty characterizes a human being.

Principles of Moral Virtues

Rasulullah is a great human being because he has perfect morals on earth as a mercy to the universe, "We have sent you 'O Prophet' only as a mercy for the whole world" (QS. Al-Anbya' [21]: 107) as well as an example for mankind, "Indeed, in the Messenger of Allah you have an excellent example for whoever has hope in Allah and the Last day, and remembers Allah often" (QS. Al-Ahzab [33]: 21); all his words and actions are revelations under the guidance of Allah SWT, "Nor did he speak (about the Qur'an and its explanations) of his own whims. (QS. An-Najm [53]: 3-4) and his attitude towards life is a reflection of the Qur'an: "And you are truly a man of outstanding character. (QS. Al-Qalam [68]: 4). These verses are the basis of human moral perfection as described by Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali.

Human perfection is very much related to the virtues of (*al-fadā'il*) or the functioning of human potentials in accordance with the demands of human perfection (Murad Wahab, dkk, 1971). Conversely, not functioning according to the requirements of perfection is called vice. (*al-radhā'il*). Thus, virtue requires a certain harmony in the functional relationship of human potential. Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali share the same view in realizing the doctrine of the middle way (*al-wasāt*) as the basis of moral virtues doctrine was recognized by earlier philosophers. For example, Mencius (551-479 BC), a Chinese philosopher who wrote a book about "*The Doctrine of The Mean*"²⁰(James Legge (pent.), *The Four Book: Confucian Analects: The Great Learning, The Doctrine of The Mean, and The Work of Mencius* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 5.) Also Greek philosophers like Plato (427-347 BC), Aristotle (384-322 BC), and Muslim philosophers like al-Kindi and Ibn Sina.²¹ (Plato, lihat, Plato, *The Statements, Phlebus, and Ion*, ter. Harold N. Fowler dan W. R. M. Lamb (London: Harvard University Press, 1962), 253-73; Aristoteles, "Nicomachean Ethics" dalam *The Work of Aristotle*, ter., W. D. Ross (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1952). Dan, Al-Kindi look, Abd. Halim Mahmud, *Al-Afkar al-Falsafi fi al-Islam*, (Bayrut: Dar alKitab al-Ul bani, 1982).

Ibn Miskawaih generally defines the middle way (*al-wasāt*) as an attitude of balance, moderation, harmony, main, noble, or middle position between the two extremes of excess (*al-tafrīt*) and deficiency (*al-ifrit*).

In this regard, Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali agree in proposing the four highest virtues (*ummahāh al-fadhā'il*), namely *al-hikmat* as the virtue of reason, *al-shajā'ah* as the virtue of power, *al-gadab*, *al-'iffah* as the virtue of the power of *alshahwah* and *al-'adālah* as the balance of power (Al-Gazālī, *al-Ma'ārij al-Quds...*, 92; Ibnu Miskawaih, *Tabdhīb alAkhilāq...*, 46-9.) The difference between Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali, in this case, is in the view of Ibn Miskawaih, who agrees with Aristoteles that *al-'adālah* is the middle between persecuted (*al-inzilām*) and persecutor (*al-zulūm*), which has many branches, including friendship, ability to cooperate, wisdom in deciding issues, love, and worship. Meanwhile, al-Ghazali agrees with Ibn Sina, who views justice as having only one opposite meaning, namely persecution (*al-jaw*), and therefore has no branches (Muhammad Ahmad Syarif, 1975).

Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali argue that the tools used as a measure to achieve a middle attitude are reason and Sharia. However, Ibn Miskawaih did not cite the Qur'an and Hadith in describing the middle attitude in morality, while Al-Ghazali based it on an Islamic foundation that was strengthened by the arguments of the Qur'an and Hadith, such as a modest attitude in spending property, eating, and drinking (Mahmud, *Al-Tafkir...*,325.)

On the possibility of reaching the middle position of *al-'adālah*. Al-Ghazali argued that only the Messenger can reach the middle position, while ordinary people can only approach it and cannot reach it (Nasution, *Filsafat...*, 26.) However, Ibn Miskawaih, like Aristotle and al-Farabi, optimistically argues that everyone is likely to reach the middle position of *al-'adālah* if certain rules are followed.²⁶ (Ibn Miskawayh, *Tabdhīb al-Akhilāq wa Tathir al-'Araq*, ed. Hasan Tamim (Bayrūt: Manshūrat Dār al-Maktabah al-Hayat, 1938), 46; Muhammad Abdul Quasem, 1975) This opinion, when applied to the world of education, will of course have implications for business motivation. Ibn Miskawaih's concept provides more opportunities for persistent effort accompanied by an optimistic attitude to be able to achieve it, while al-Ghazali on the contrary makes someone pessimistic to achieve ideal morality. Of the four main moral virtues that distinguish between al-Ghazali and Ibn Miskawaih, those on wisdom (*al-hikmah*), courage (*al-shajā'ah*), purity of self (*al-'iffah*), and justice (*al-'adālah*).

Wisdom (*al-hikmah*)

Both al-Ghazali and Ibn Miskawaih argue that *al-hikmah* is the middle between the two extremes of excess (*al-'iffah*) and deficiency (*al-tahrit*), the only difference between the two being the designation of the term. Ibn Miskawaih uses the term *al-safah* (impudence) for extreme excess, while al-Ghazali uses the term *al-khibb* (shrewd deceiver). For both terms, *al-kibble* has a deeper meaning than *al-safah*. Although both use the term *al-balah* for extreme shortcomings, they give different meanings to the term *al-balah*. According to Ibn Miskawaih,

al-blah means "lack of will", while al-Ghazali means "lack of the quality of the soul 'aa means "lack of the quality of the soul 'aqlat". (Musa, *Al-Falsafat...*, 160-1.)

The four moral virtues have branches. For the wisdom (*al-hikmah*), Ibn Miskawaih mentions seven branches of virtue, namely 1) sharpness of intelligence (*al-zakā*"), 2) strong memory (*al-dhikr*), 3) rationality (*ta'aqqūl*), 4) agility (*sur'at*), 5) clear memory (*shafa al-zihn*), 6) clear thinking (*jawdat al-zihn*), and 7) easy learning (*suhūl al-ta'lum*). (Ibn Miskawayh, *Tabdhīb...*, 4.) While al-Ghazali mentions only five kinds of virtues of the wisdom (*al-hikmah*), namely 1) good thinking (*husn al-tadbīr*), 2) clear thinking (*jawdat al-zihn*), 3) brilliant opinions (*saqabat al-ra'y*), 4) accurate predictions (*ithbāt al-zann*), and 5) always being aware of the faults and defilements of the soul, even the most subtle ones (*al-tafathun li daqā'iq al-'amal wa khaḥāyāfāt al-nufūs*) (Al-Gazālī, *Mizān...*, 27.)

Judging from the urgency of acquiring *al-hikmah* or wisdom in moral education is that a person will behave and act wisely in dealing with all the very complex issues of life, both on behalf of individuals who are directly related to Allah the creator (*al-khāliq*) and their environment. So that he will find happiness in his attitude.

According to Abd.Halim in Journal written by Ab Halim Tamuri and Ahmad Munawwar Ismail, in the context of industrial revolution 4.0, the process of socialization and maturity of adolescents whenIn the context of the industrial revolution 4.0, the process of socialization and maturity of today's adolescents takes place with variations depending on their environment,takes place with variations depending on their environment.In principle, the lifestyle of Islamic adolescents cannot be equated with that of Western adolescents because education for Muslim adolescents must be based on because education for Muslim adolescents must be based on Islamic values, including tawhid and shirk values, including Tawhid and Islamic morality,(*International Journal of Islamic Thought, Vol 19 :Juni 2021*),3.

Courage (*al-shajā'ah*)

Courage is the virtue of anger (al-gadab) because it is guided by al-hikmah, the virtue of the soul of al-natīqah. And this quality is the middle between cowardice (aljubn) and despair (al-tahawwur). In addition to Al-Ghazali and Ibn Miskawaih, Aristoteles, Al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina also argued this way (Syarif,Ghazali's..., 44.)

The attributes of courage (*al-shajā'ah*), cowards (*al-jubn*), and desperate (*al-tahawwur*) are closely related to anger. Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali disagree on the limits of impeccable anger. Ibn Miskawaih says that the limits are reason and shara", while al-Ghazali puts more

emphasis on the limits of shara" (Ibn Miskawayh, *Tabdhīb...*, 106; Al-Gazālī, *al-‘Arba‘īn fī Usul al-Dīn*, (Bayrūt: Dār al-Jil, 1988). This can also be seen in his opinion about the consideration in making courageous decisions to obtain a noble death, Al-Ghazali focuses his consideration only on the consequences after death, while Ibn Miskawaih focuses on the rest of life if he does not take the alternative in addition to the consequences after death.

Like wisdom (*al-hikmah*), courage (*al-shajā‘ah*) has branches. Ibn Miskawaih mentions nine branches for *al-shajā‘ah*, namely great soul (*kibār al-nafs*), helping (*al-najdāh*), calmness (*‘izam al-himmat*), perseverance (*al-sabat*), patience (*al-sabr*), generosity (*al-bilm*), restraint (*‘adam al-taysy*), strength (*al-shahamat*), and pleasure in work (*ihtimal al-kadd*) (Ibn Miskawayh, *Tabdhīb...*,42.) While al-Ghazali mentioned ten branches, namely nobility (*al-karam*), helping (*al-najdāh*), might (*al-shahamat*), great soul (*kibār al-nafs*), endurance (*ihtimal*), generosity (*al-bilm*), self-knowledge (*al-waqar*), and humble (*al-tawadu’*) (Al-Gazālī, *Ihya’*, Juz III, 53.)

The difference between Ibn Miskawaih and Al-Ghazali is seen in including branches of virtue. If Al-Ghazali includes glory (*al-karam*) as a branch of *al-shajā‘ah*, while Ibn Miskawaih includes *al-karam* as a branch of maintaining personal purity (*al-iffah*). Ibn Miskawaih included patience (*al-sabr*) in the two virtues of *al-shajā‘ah* which means patience in facing tough problems in *al-iffah*, patience here means holding back the lust of all delights that have bad consequences. While al-Ghazali included patience as a branch of *al-shajā‘ah* in the second sense. *Al-waqar* is categorized by al-Ghazali into the branch of *al-shajā‘ah* and Ibn Miskawaih includes it in the branch of *al-iffah*. This difference is because al-Ghazali put *al-waqar* as a middle attitude between arrogant with humble in the sense of putting oneself in its proper place. After all, it knows the level of its own abilities (Al-Gazālī, *Mizān...*, 276). While Ibn Miskawaih interprets *al-waqar* as calmness and firmness of spirit when facing something.³⁵ (Ibn Miskawaih, *Tabdhīb...*, 42). Al-Ghazali also included *al-karam* and *al-nubl* in the *al-shajā‘ah* branch, while Ibn Miskawaih included it in the *al-iffah* sub-branch.

The difference between Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali in categorizing the branches of glory is due to the closeness of the meaning and understanding of these branches, as well as the relationship between the virtues of these powers in their systems and functions.

Maintaining the purity of self (*al-iffah*)

Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali agree on putting *al-iffah* as the middle between greed (*al-sharah*) and cold-heartedness. (*khumūd al-shahwat*), Both also agree that reason and shara" are used as a barometer in determining the middle position. *Al-iffah* Because the virtue of *al-*

shahwiyah is closely related to human physical needs such as eating, drinking, dressing, and sex. To regulate all these for children is through habituation and practice. In terms of moral upbringing, this virtue is realized when parents as well as teachers always direct and guide them until they finally become accustomed to the virtues in question.

Al-iffah has more branches than the previous two virtues, both proposed by Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali. However, upon further observation, it can be concluded that both prioritize the salvation of personal souls, although in different proportions. This difference is seen when Ibn Miskawaih includes six branches of generosity (*al-sakha'*) as a social trait, then al-Ghazali provides only three branches for *al-iffah* regarding social virtues. (Lihat, Syarif, *Ghazali's...*, 65) From these differences, it can be concluded that al-Ghazali's morality is individual Sufi, while Ibn Maskawaih's morality is more social.

Justice (*al-'Adālah*)

The realization of justice in a person will be when there is integrity and harmony among the three virtues of the soul. al-hikmah, al-shajā'ah and al-iffah. Therefore, al-Ghazali argues that al-'adālah (justice) has no branches, only an opponent of justice is injustice (*al-jawr*). Unlike al-Ghazali, Ibn Miskawaih argues that justice is the middle between persecution (*al-zulūm*) and persecuted (*inzilām*) and also has branches, namely friendship (*al-shadaqat*), goodness in cooperation (*husn al-sharikah*), wisdom in deciding matters (*husn al-qada'*), love (*tawadud*), and worship (*al-'ibādah*).

For the present era, so that the middle-way doctrine does not lose its barometer and remains relevant, the middle-way doctrine can be understood as a doctrine that contains nuances of dynamics. This means that there is a tug-of-war between needs, opportunities, capabilities, and effectiveness. Therefore, the measure of "middle morality" will always change in accordance with the pace of development of the times, which includes determining the pace of economic, social, political, and cultural growth and development. As a concrete example, the measure of simplicity for the lower community is different from the measure of simplicity for the middle and upper classes, as are the measures of goodness for the four other virtues of al-hikmah (wisdom), al-shajā'ah (courage), al-iffah (purity of self), and al-'adālah (justice).

From these differences, it is clear that Ibn Miskawaih built his ethical theory by referring to the moral statements of the Qur'an and al-Sunnah with the accuracy of abstraction and analysis using philosophical methods and categories. Therefore, according to Madjid Fakhry, Ibn Maskawaih's ethical concept is the ethics of scriptural morality. (Madjid Fakhry,

Etika dalam Islam, ter., Zakiyuddin Baidhawiy, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996), xxi-iii.)

Whereas al-Ghazali's concept of ethics is religious ethics, because his ethical theory is rooted in the Qur'an, al-Sunnah, theological concepts, philosophical categories, and Sufism. This ethics has the most Islamic characteristics, but unfortunately, al-Ghazali was not able to combine them harmoniously, so the brilliance of his opinion is limited to Sufi clothes.

Components of Moral Education

Purpose

Education, according to al-Ghazali, is basically moral education, so he formulated the purpose of education to eliminate bad morals and instill good morals (Madjid, *Konsep...*, 86.) Furthermore, in the book "Maw'idzāt al-Mu'minīn", he explains that the nature of morality is the state or constitution of the soul that remains (constant), which is the source of the birth of actions naturally, easily, without requiring consideration and thought. And in the end, al-Ghazali straightforwardly suggests two goals to be achieved; first, human perfection, which aims to get closer to Allah. Second, human perfection is aimed at achieving happiness in this world and the hereafter. While Ibn Miskawaih formulated the goal of moral education, in *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq* it is the realization of a moral person with a noble character. Noble character spontaneously arises from the mind (soul/character) in order to achieve perfection and sa'adat (perfect happiness). Furthermore, Ibn Miskawaih explained that man cannot achieve perfection by living alone, but must be supported by society.

The difference that underlies the formulation of the goals of moral education by Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali lies in the methodology of achieving perfection. Ibn Miskawaih uses the analytical method while al-Ghazali uses the hypothetical method. These differences are: First, the perfection referred to by Ibn Miskawaih will not be achieved by itself, but must be with the community. This indicates that the nature of Ibn Miskawaih's morality is social morality. Meanwhile, according to al-Ghazali, perfection can be achieved through ascetic practices, so the nature of al-Ghazali's morality is monolithic. Second, perfection according to Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali is practical and theoretical perfection. The first (practical perfection) functions to move the body through the sensitive powers of the soul by the requirements of knowledge attained through theoretical reason, and its perfection is the perfection of character, namely by arranging the faculties of the soul so that they do not clash with each other but live in harmony within themselves. This first perfection is closely related to the second perfection (theoretical perfection), which is immaterial and abstract and deals with abstract and universal knowledge. While perfection is to attain the highest knowledge which is abstract and universal. Ibn Miskawaih argues that this knowledge is obtained with the

acquisition of reason (al-'aql al-mustafad). This acquisition mind will be able to receive the radiance of *al-hikmah* from the active mind (al-'aql al-af'al), as how to do it is with serious effort in sharpening the power of thought (Ibn Miskawiyh, "Fi al-.,Aql wa al-Ma.,qul", dalam Arabica, (Leiden: Swets & Zeitlinger BV., Vol. XI, 1964), 85; Qs. al-Qalam (68): 4). Meanwhile, according to al-Ghazali, the highest knowledge is obtained through intuition (*al-dhawq*) by sharpening the power of al-dhawq through self-purification from worldly desires to be united with God. Unity with God will reveal all the secrets and attributes of God (Nasution, *Manusia....*, 36).

Material

Ibn Miskawaih does not distinguish between religious and non-religious sciences. Regarding the material for moral education, he mentions three main measures, namely: (1) things that are obligatory for the needs of the body, (2) things that are obligatory for the needs of the soul, and (3) things that are obligatory for human relation (Ibn Miskawaih, *Tabdhīb....*, 116). The three subjects can be obtained from two sources, namely: (1) rational sciences (al-'ulūm al-fikriyyat) and (2) empirical sciences (al-'ulūm al-hissiyah).

In contrast to Ibn Miskawaih, al-Ghazali divides science into two main parts, namely religious and non-religious sciences. Of the two main parts, they are divided into three groups, namely: (1) praiseworthy sciences, (2) despicable sciences, (3) sciences that are sometimes praiseworthy, and vice versa. Al-Ghazali also mentions three sources of knowledge, namely: (1) rational sciences obtained by using the ratio, (2) empirical sciences obtained by feeling, and (3) al-kasyāf science (inner science) obtained by intuition (al-dhawq).

From the classification proposed by Al-Ghazali, it is necessary to highlight, among others, that the sciences that function to sharpen the intellect and clarify thinking, such as mathematics and science as branches of philosophy, are considered very dangerous sciences because they lead to confusion and chaos of thought, which, if applied to metaphysical studies, can lead to disbelief (Montgomery Watt, 1953).

The consequences of al-Ghazali's views are in the formation of Muslims' mindset (system of thought) and attitude towards science, which slowly but surely kills and weakens the critical and historical scientific spirit. Thus, according to Fazlurrahman, at least al-Ghazali is responsible for Muslims' decline in science and technology (Abdullah, *Studi....*, 251).

In order to regenerate an active, creative, progressive, and innovative mindset, it is necessary to revive Ibn Miskawaih's moral teaching materials with philosophical nuances with various branches with an Islamic epistemological building so that the next generation is expected to be the host in the era of take-off and not just a guest.

Educators and Learners

Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali both argue that the first educators are the parents. This is understandable because parents are the cause of his birth. Presumably, both of them also based it on a very popular hadith narrated by Imam Muslim: "Every child is born pure. It is his parents who will make him a Christian or a Jew".

Furthermore, both of them highly appreciate and view the degree of an educator. Hence, Ibn Miskawaih places the degree of an educator between parents and God and calls him the father of the soul (*wālid ruhani*) and the noblest person (*rabb Bashari*). According to Ibn Miskawaih, only philosophers and prophets can attain this degree. (Ibn Miskawaih, *Tabdhīb...*, 133). Meanwhile, according to al-Ghazali, it was attained by the prophets, saints, and Sufis (Fatiyah, *Konsepsi...*, 33). The reason for this is that the educator can lead the student to wisdom, fill him with high wisdom, and point him toward eternal life and happiness. By positioning Sufis as the parents of the mind (*wālid ruhani*) without including philosophers, al-Ghazali's Sufi ethical style becomes clearer.

The task of an educator is to provide, maintain, and develop all aspects of personality for healthy and perfect growth, both physical, spiritual, intellectual, and moral. For this reason, the function of educators in developing human potential—body, mind, faith, morals, beauty, and social society—is maximized, harmonized, and harmonious. It is hoped that such an educational system will produce quality human resources and noble morals.

Environment

Based on the premise that every character can be changed (Ibn Miskawaih, 58. Lihat al-Gazālī, *Ihya'*, Edition III, 69). Thus, Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali are very concerned about the influence of the environment in moral education. From the results of the study of the two figures, it can be concluded that three main environments significantly affect moral education, namely: (1) the family environment with parents as the central figure; (2) the school environment with teachers as the central figure; and (3) the community environment with community leaders as the central figure.

Of the three educational environments, al-Ghazali added that food and drink, a source of energy for forming personality, are also fundamental (Al-Gazālī, *Ihya'*). Because of the close

relationship between the food consumed by the body and the formation of the personality, Islam is very concerned about food, as mentioned in the Qur'an: "Eat from the good food that We give you (Qs. al-Baqarah (2): 172.)

From a health science perspective, this relationship shows that the food consumed will function First as an energy substance. The human body needs energy to work and move. This energy comes from the combustion of food substances in the body. Proteins, carbohydrates, and fats are included in this energy substance. Second, as a building material. From conception to completion, the human body goes through a growth process in which new cells are produced to form body parts. This building material includes minerals, proteins, and water. Third, as a regulatory substance. Movement and body temperature must be regulated to function well and remain normal. Therefore, the body needs a regulating substance consisting of vitamins, minerals, and water (Pemda DKI, 1990).

The relationship between food and personality formation is that food in the form of material nourishes the body (material), and halal intangible properties (immaterial) inherent in food have implications for mental health.

Methods

The thoughts related to the methods of moral education of Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali have a similar vision, namely, as a strategy to achieve the goals both set. All the methods used by Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali can be applied to moral education today, but what educators need to pay attention to when using the methods is not to be trapped in teaching and doctrinal methods. The reality in Indonesia is that moral education, especially in Islamic boarding schools and religious schools, is still done through memorization methods, thus giving less priority to the application of understanding, which is considered more important in teaching and learning. To be able to lead there, it is necessary to emphasize that moral education is a method that can lead students to find their values to be developed by first recognizing the components of morality consisting of (1) Choosing cognitive aspects, (a) freely and guided, (b) from different alternatives, and (c) after considering the consequences of choices; (2) Appreciating affective aspects; (a) feeling happy about their choices, and (b) being willing to emphasize their choices in public; (3) Appreciating psychomotor aspects; (a) doing something for their choices, and (b) doing it repeatedly so that a pattern is formed (Sastrapratedja, 2000)

According to Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali, the key to moral education in the educational process is that human beings are born with a good nature. The belief in the existence

of fitrah has practical implications for the methods that should be used in the teaching and learning process.

In moral education, a method is appropriate if it contains intrinsic and extrinsic values through the educational material and can be functionally used to realize the ideal values in Islamic education's objectives. The methods, curriculum, and objectives of Islamic education contain ideal and operational relevance in the educational process (Arifin, 1993) *Wa al-Lāh a 'lam bi al-sawāb*.

CONCLUSION

Moral education is generally divided into rational moral education and mystical moral education. This is due to the difference in approach. Rational moral education is not only based on the approach of Islamic teachings as an absolute doctrine but also uses a humanitarian approach. Meanwhile, mystical moral education approaches Islamic teachings as absolute teachings (divine approach). The humanitarian approach indicates that human beings are autonomous, while the divine approach places human beings as heteronomous creatures.

Comparing their thoughts on the concept of moral thinking, the following can be concluded:

1. Ibn Miskawaih views human nature as consisting of two substances: first, the substance in the form of the body as material knowledge, and second, the soul (al-nafs), which is a dimensionless substance as immaterial knowledge, and this is what is the essence of man. Al-Ghazali in his philosophical book *ma'ārij alquds* holds the same view as Ibn Miskawaih. However, in the discussion of morality, al-Ghazali refers to immaterial knowledge with three terms: spirit (al-rūh), soul (al-nafs), and corpse (al-jism). However, the essence of man remains the same, namely al-nafs (soul).
2. Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali share the same opinion in proposing the four highest virtues (ummahāh al-fadhā'il), namely wisdom (al-hikmat) as the virtue of reason, al-shajā'ah as the virtue of power, al-gadab, al-'iffah as the virtue of alshahwah power, and al-'adālah as the balance of power. In this case, the difference between Ibn Miskawaih and al-Ghazali is in the division of each virtue (fadhai'l).
3. The two figures' comparisons of the components of moral education differ in the formulation of goals, materials, methods, teachers and students, learning methods, and learning environments. This difference is due to the difference in the concept of human nature.

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